However, she failed to consider evidence that individuals construct images in stages. Thus, from the perspective of the brain, mental simulation and mental imagery are similar.
First, simulations are, in the words of Fisher , ‘epistemic devices’ (p. 419). In other words, they make available or generate knowledge. For example, in simulating the sound of a police siren, you can access stored information about its acoustical properties to answer questions such as ‘does a police siren have a constant pitch? In addition, mental simulations can be used to generate knowledge, allowing you to answer presumably novel questions such as ‘how does a police siren differ from an ambulance siren?
The underlying mechanisms used to recreate the scenario may be the same or different from the original. Simulation of a race car is based on the actual click this link vehicle hardware, to make the experience more realistic.
On the other hand, a financial simulation depends completely on the mathematical model on which the scenario is based upon. Consider the virtual computers that can be created within a computer using specified software such as Virtual Box or VMWare. Installed on a windows environment, this software can create virtual computers to emulate Linux, Solaris, Mac, or any other operating system.
However, we note that many mental processes other than simulation make available or generate knowledge (e.g. semantic memory, deduction), and hence this feature cannot by itself define simulation. In the first line of simulators you are saying they are used to "imitate",however in the differences you have listed "imitation" for emulators. In a simulator, the operation of a targeted system is recreated to the best possible.
Again, we argue that this similarity applies specifically to emulative simulations. Nearly all of these differing treatments of simulation converge on the two essential features of mental simulations.
However, in order to qualify as simulation, and thereby serve as an epistemic device, a simulation must feed into processes used in working memory. Even if an implicit process were to operate via sequential analogy, it would not qualify as an emulation unless it produces consciously accessible information. As Fisher stated, ‘a simulation is supposed to work by providing an epistemically available process that reflects the relevant aspects of some process that is not so epistemically available’ (p. 419). Citing evidence that individuals construct mental simulations of mechanical systems in a piecemeal fashion, Hegarty claimed that simulation differs from imagery.